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Abstract
Use-After-Free vulnerabilities, allowing the attacker to access
unintended memory via dangling pointers, are more threaten-
ing. However, most state-of-art detection schemes can only
detect dangling pointers and invalid them during the develop-
ment and test phase, but not provide a tolerance mechanism
to repair the errors at runtime. Also, these techniques obtain
and manage the metadata inefficiently with complex struc-
tures and too much scan (sweep). The goal of this paper is
to eliminate dangling pointers automatically and efficiently
using compiler instrumentation with acceptable performance
and memory overhead.
In this paper, we observe that most techniques lack accurate
low-performance pointer graph metadata maintaining meth-
ods, so they need to scan the log to reduce the redundancy
and sweep the whole address space to find dangling pointers.
Also, they lack a direct, efficiently obtaining pointer graph
metadata approach. The key insight of this paper is that a
unique identifier can be used as a key to a hash or direct-map
algorithm. Thus, this paper maintains the same implicit iden-
tifier with each memory object and its corresponding referent,
associating the unique ID with metadata for memory objects,
to provide schemes of obtaining and managing the pointer
graph metadata efficiently. Therefore, with the delayed free
technique adopted into C/C++, we present the DangKiller as
a novel and lightweight dangling pointer elimination solution.
We first demonstrate the MinFat Pointer, which can calcu-
late unique implicit ID for each object and pointer quickly,
and a shared-hash algorithm to obtain metadata. Secondly,
we propose the Log Cache and Log Compression mecha-
nism based on the ID to decrease the redundancy of dangling
pointer candidates. Coupled with the Address Tagging archi-
tecture on an ARM64 system, our experiments show that the
DangKiller can eliminate use-after-free vulnerabilities and
provide full temporal memory safety at only 11% and 3% run-
time overheads for the SPEC CPU2006 and 2017 benchmarks
respectively, except for unique cases.
1 Introduction
Use-after-free (UAF) is the leading cause of memory tem-
poral errors, which means a program uses pointers point-
ing to deleted objects, i.e., dangling pointers. According to
Microsoft’s annual vulnerability report, UAF is among the
top 3 root causes of recent attacks [43]. And it is a typi-
cal and common one exploited for return-oriented program-
ming [15, 20, 27, 55] and, data-only attacks [35].
Over the past decades, researchers have proposed many
mitigation mechanisms against UAF vulnerabilities. Most of
them are detection techniques with unbearable performance
and memory overhead. Once applying such techniques to
online services, services will be slower or even unavailable.
In addition, they also require programmers to modify and re-
fine the source code during the development and maintenance
phases. However, programs today are more and more complex
with their functionality increasing, which in turn increases the
difficulty of fixing errors [50]. What’s more, due to the diffi-
culty of finding dangling pointers, it is more tough to repair
the bugs than the buffer overflow and uninitialized memory
reading [41,59,60], so even if a vulnerability is detected, these
vulnerabilities cannot be easily resolved. While eliminating
techniques using delayed free, such as garbage collection, can
eliminate the possibility of terminating the execution because
of memory errors [54]. So, the service will not crash but may
have some unanticipated result of one request. Thus, an error
in the computation for one request tends to have little or no
effect on the computation for subsequent requests [51]. So the
online service can be more reliable. Therefore, this paper’s
goal is to provide a novel and lightweight dangling pointer
elimination solution.
One of the mainstream elimination techniques [16], period-
ically scans the entire address space to find a dangling pointer.
Since it is a sweep garbage collector without a pointer graph,
it needs to sweep the whole memory area to confirm whether
some memory locations store the reference to the object to be
freed [16]. To reduce the performance overhead, it uses multi-
ple threads periodically synchronously to sweep the address
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space, and may result in memory leak. And there are some
methods follow its sweeping idea [42, 58], but no matter how
they reduce the overhead, they still cannot avoid scanning the
whole memory area to find dangling pointers. However, on
resource-constrained embedded devices or high-loaded server
devices, multi-threading techniques can put more pressure
on devices, especially memory reads and writes. A pointer
graph can keep track of all the pointers to each memory ob-
ject so that the location of the potential dangling pointers can
be detected accurately without scanning. Therefore, this pa-
per hopes to combine the pointer graph with the elimination
techniques.
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Figure 1: DangSan Performance Overhead On SPEC
CPU2006
Various detection schemes shield software from dangling
pointer exploitation [41, 54, 56, 60] by using pointer graph.
Using logs of pointer locations linked to each object or refer-
ence counts, these approaches can obtain the locations of the
potential dangling pointers in the memory. We found that the
general process of pointer tracking could be divided into three
steps: (1) Search for the corresponding object log metadata
when a heap pointer is to be stored in memory; (2) Search
the log and update the metadata if the memory location has
not been recorded. (3) When freeing an object, if there are
dangling pointers, use different approaches to handle those
dangling pointers. However, these works tend to incur an ex-
cessively high performance overhead which is attributed to the
inefficient search and maintenance of the pointer graph. We
evaluated Dangsan, one of the most efficient state-of-art work,
as shown in Figure 1. We find most benchmarks with higher
performance overhead have occupied more than half overhead
for search and maintenance, and some can even reach more
than 90%. The main reasons for the high computational costs
are as follows: (1) Lack of a direct mapping between objects
metadata and pointers referring them. Dangsan [56] relies on
complex shadow memory structures to find metadata, while
CRCount [54] uses the interface from the memory alloca-
tor. Both of them incur unacceptable performance overhead.
(2) Vast redundancy in the number of the candidate dangling
pointer locations. To reduce the redundancy, these methods
often scan lookup table in the log, leading to tremendous cost.
Our insight is that these problems can be solved by letting
pointers and their intended referent share the same unique
implicit ID. With the help of such IDs, we could quickly
obtain the intended referent of a pointer, and immediately
reach the metadata indicating an object’s lifetime with hash
or direct-map algorithm. As for the vast redundancy and re-
ducing redundancy procedure, if we have the unique ID, we
could build a cache to determine directly whether a particular
memory location has been recorded in the log by combining
the memory location with its ID. What’s more, the implicit
ID should be more regular for hash algorithm and not occupy
independent memory area, compared with CETS [46] lock
and key. In this paper, we propose the DangKiller, which is a
UAF vulnerabilities elimination system that is applicable to
efficiently protect real-world C/C++ programs without modi-
fying source code. Our elimination system combines the fast
and efficient pointer tracking model with the delayed free
technique to prevent the generation of dangling pointers dur-
ing program execution with an acceptable performance and
memory overhead. The overhead of DangKiller is lower than
most of the existing detection and elimination techniques.
To give the memory object and its corresponding point-
ers a unique implicit ID, we demonstrate the MinFat Pointer
[12, 18, 19, 39], which is a simple Tagged Pointer scheme.
MinFat Pointer constrains the sizes of allocated memory and
their alignments to powers of two, and store log2(size) in the
high bits of the pointer. With such pointers, the Dangkiller
can obtain the base address of an object easily and use it as
the implicit ID of the object and pointers, assuming no spatial
memory errors. And a shared hash algorithm and log structure
are also presented to obtain the object metadata based on the
ID to help reduce the performance overhead associated with
metadata searching. To reduce the location redundancy and
complexity of scanning the lookup table, we propose the Log
Cache. The Log Cache is a metadata structure to determine
whether the memory location has been stored in the object log
quickly by combining location with the ID. However, the tag
on high bits also introduces compatibility problems, because
a tagged pointer can not be used to access memory directly.
These tags need to be masked off, which will bring signifi-
cant performance overheads. Luckily, this problem has been
solved by the Address Tagging proposed by ARM/SPARC
systems. In particular, ARM has added the Address Tagging
to the ARMv8 ISA which is designed for servers and desk-
tops [6]. ARMv8 architecture ignores the highest 8 bits of a
pointer when accessing memory. Some existing work, such as
HWASAN [53], uses the same technique to reduce the perfor-
mance overhead and improve its compatibility. We adopted
the delayed free technique, and optimized the free_list struc-
ture. Objects are freed until all the references of the objects
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Figure 2: Comparison of temporal memory safety solutions
disappear by themselves during program execution.
We make the following contributions:
• We propose DangKiller, the first dangling pointer elimi-
nation technique combined with Pointer Graph in C/C++.
Our system can run with a reasonable performance over-
head and has good scalability.
• We propose a scheme to correlate pointers with their
intended referent by having them to share the same im-
plicit unique ID. A tagged pointer system named MinFat
Pointer is integrated to support the quick calculation of
IDs. Furthermore, we utilize the Address Tagging fea-
ture in ARM64 architectures to relieve the compatibility
problems and performance overhead caused by tagged
pointers.
• We propose a shared hash algorithm and log structure
to reduce the overhead of searching and maintaining
the pointer graph. We also provide pointer Log Cache, a
metadata structure verifying redundancy quickly. Finally,
we propose Log Compression to reduce the redundant
reference further.
• We use LLVM-LTO pass on the llvm-3.8 platform and
combine it with a static analysis method to achieve the
goal of eliminating the dangling pointer. We evaluate
DangKiller and show it is able to eliminate dangling
pointers with acceptable overhead and even lower than
state-of-the-art work.
2 Background and Related Work
Most of the dangling pointer detection tools are used during
software development. After discovering errors causing the
program to crash, programmers have to patch the source code,
which will consume a lot of resources, seriously damaging
the productivity of software development. On the other hand,
the elimination technique can tolerate dangling pointers by
leaving an object undeleted until all the pointers referring
it vanish by themselves during the program execution, i.e.
delayed free.
Temporal memory safety violations occur when a program
accesses a deallocated object. There has been several solutions
proposed for temporal memory safety. Memory allocator [14,
21, 47] attempts to prevent allocated objects from ending up
at the same address as previously freed objects. [11,22,24,25]
used pool allocation for the same purpose. Other works [12,
52, 57] track per-object metadata: e.g., ASAN [52] poisons
deallocated objects, and report access to the poisoned area.
Also, some static analysis approaches [29] were proposed, but
they could only recognize relatively simple cases and were
therefore inherently prone to false negatives.
2.1 Pointer graph based scheme
Most schemes use the pointer graph-based method
[41, 54, 56, 60]. They keep track of the pointers for each
memory object and build a pointer graph where the nodes
and edges are the objects and their connections, respectively.
Figure 2 shows such a method, which generally has the
following three steps. (1) Searching: when a pointer is about
to be stored in the memory, the pointer is used to find the
memory object pointed to and obtain the corresponding
pointer graph. (2) Tracking: update the reference in the
pointer graph based on the memory location of the pointer.
(3) Handling: when the memory object is freed, the reference
retained in the pointer graph is used to prevent the dangling
pointer from being accessed.
Searching. Mappings between objects and their meta-
data have been widely proposed. The DangNull [41] uses a
thread-safe shadowed red-black tree to locate the metadata
corresponding to the memory object with an unacceptable
performance overhead when the entire memory area is
tracked. The FreeSentry [60] is based on the label lookup
table and continuously finds log metadata on multiple levels.
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The DangSan [56] uses two levels of the shadow memory [34]
to acquire the log metadata. Similarly, Bogo [61] uses MPX’s
two-level Bound Tables [48], which are both complicated.
Some other works [54] rely on the interface provided by the
memory allocator to obtain the object identity and locate the
metadata. Regardless of the complex data structure and the
interface provided by the memory allocator, the pointer to
object mapping is complex, and has a large performance
overhead. This is mainly because the priories do not have an
efficient method of correlating a pointer with its intended
referent and do not share a same ID for each memory object.
Tracking. There are many approaches proposed to
maintain or update the pointer graph in different ways. The
FreeSentry and DangNull transfer the original references to
the new object based on its location. To reduce the overhead
of registering reference, CRCount [54] only retains the
reference count without maintaining the reference graph.
However, the reference count alone cannot adequately
describe the reference between the memory objects. While
DangSan only registers new references but do not remove the
original one. To reduce the redundant references to the same
object, this approach uses a lookup table and hash table to
verify whether the reference has been recorded. As a result,
the performance overhead is significant. Therefore, this paper
hopes to propose a pointer graph with a low maintenance
overhead and minimal redundancy.
Handling. When the user frees an object, there are
two main schemes that can be adopted. Most detection
techniques nullify all the pointers pointing to the object being
deallocated. When a dangling pointer is dereferenced, a
segmentation fault is triggered to prevent the program from
continuing to run. In contrast, elimination methods usually
delay the free of objects until there is no reference to the
object. CRCount uses delayed free, which frees the object
gradually. Since the reference count can lead to deadlock,
CRCount can only partially eliminates the dangling pointers.
In this paper, we hope to propose a technique that eliminates
all the dangling pointers using the delayed free technique.
2.2 Identifier based scheme
There are also identifier-based schemes [45, 46] using a lock
and key to identify pointers and objects. This type of method
allocates an explicit, non-repeating ID for each object and
stores it in separate metadata. This method allows the pro-
gram to determine quickly whether the object and pointer are
corresponding to each other. Thus, the load/store operations
is only allowed when the lock and key are the same. Although
this method can quickly detect objects and pointers that do
not correspond, obtaining the explicit ID has a relatively large
performance overhead since IDs are stored in a disjoint meta-
data structure. Meanwhile, the separate metadata storage ID
will also bring a certain memory overhead.
2.3 Address Tagging
A tagged pointer is often subjected to problems due to its
inability to access memory directly. When a Tagged Pointer is
used to access memory, the tag needs to first be masked. Ad-
dress Tagging provides architecture level support for Tagged
Pointer [6]. In particular, ARM added the Address Tagging
to the ARMv8 ISA, which is also the default configuration
option of the system. Using this technique, the processor can
ignore the upper 8 bits of the pointer during memory access.
Some existing works, such as HWASAN [4,53], use this tech-
nique to store the tag that corresponds to the object in the
upper 8 bits, which reduces the memory access overhead and
improves the compatibility. Thus, once Address Tagging im-
plemented, the Tagged Pointer can directly access the memory
without masking.
3 Motivation
The goal of this paper is to eliminate dangling pointers with
delayed free technique. To reduce the performance overhead,
we generate a unique ID for every object, and build a pointer
graph with high efficiency based on those IDs.
Figure 2 shows the general process of detecting and
eliminating dangling pointers. Whether a pointer is a
dangling pointer or not, it has to go through all three steps,
as mentioned in $2.1. Tracking can be further divided into
two steps: verifying and logging. Verifying checks whether
is reference is redundant. Logging inserts a reference into
the log. Therefore, we can calculate the overhead with the
following equation.N means the number, while T means the
time overhead.
Toverhead = Npointer ∗ (Tsearching + Tveri f ying + Tlogging +
Thandling) (1)
Overhead Quantitative Approach. The Npointer means
the number of pointer after reducing the redundancy. For
consistent cache hit rate and system access memory latency,
the Thandling and Tlogging are fixed during any program
execution. Therefore, the key to get past the performance
bottleneck is the Npointer, Tsearching and Tveri f ying, which are
related with the efficiency of metadata search and reference
verification. We analyze these two part: (1) reducing the
redundancy leads to the increase of Tveri f ying. For example,
Dangsan uses lookup table to reduce the redundancy of
references. Increasing the number of lookup table will bring
lower redundancy, and increase Tveri f ying at the same time
because Dangsan needs to go through all the tables. To solve
this problem, we use a direct-map cache based on implicit ID
to replace the lookup tables used by most approaches. And
our Log Cache can provide lower redundancy rate and the
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less Tveri f ying. (2) to reduce Tsearching, we also provide a easier
searching methods by using hash and direct-map algorithm
based on the implicit ID.
Implicit ID. To address the above problems, we propose
the implicit ID. We can be sure that any heap object will
have a base and bound address within the original allocation,
because the bounds of an object can never be enlarged, only
restricted. Thus, the base and bound address of the object can
be a unique address for each different objects during the pro-
gram execution. Since base addresses often can be obtained
more easily, our insight is that we use the base address of an
object as its unique implicit ID to represent the object and all
the subordinate pointers.
To get the base address of one object, many methods have
been proposed, such as MPX [48], CHERI [57], and tagged
pointer. Actually, any approach that can obtain the base
address of an object is suitable for DangKiller. Therefore,
our method can be greatly compatible with existing spatial
memory detection schemes. However, if we only care about
the temporal safety, those schemes have many drawbacks.
MPX has to search the page-based boundary table, and
CHERI changes all the hardware architecture to support the
capability model. As for tagged pointer, usually the highest
16 bits of 64-bit address space are used to store metadata
information [17, 38, 39], which can be used to obtain the
base and bound of the object. The LowFat Pointer [39] needs
to calculate the base and bound addresses according to the
BIMA encoded metadata. While this saves a significant
amount of memory, it increases the computational complexity
and is not suitable for the existing memory free environment.
The other works [12,26,28] embed the tag into a valid address
space to improve the compatibility and divide the program’s
virtual address space into several regions of equal size. The
object size is then allocated to powers of two to improve the
efficiency of calculating the base and bound. However, the
implementation of the region is too complicated, and the
memory allocator requires modification.
Figure 3: MinFat Pointer and its example
MinFat Pointer. To minimize the procedure, to make
the ID data more regular, and to be suitable for resource-
constrained scene, such as IoT devices, we demonstrate Min-
Fat Poiner, as shown in Figure 3(a). It uses higher-order bits
of a pointer to store size metadata so that the base can be cal-
culated by truncation. Figure 3(b) shows two MinFat Pointer
p. For example, the pointer p is 0x3000F1, with a tag 4 in it.
The tag 4 means when calculating the ID, we should truncate
the lowest 4 bits. So the ID 0x3000F0 is calculated. From the
example, we can see that the ID can be quickly calculated
just by arithmetic operation. Compared to the explicit ID,
such as CETS, our implicit ID does not occupy any memory
space and needs no sophisticated structure to obtain the ID.
Once our implicit ID is calculated, we can use the hash and
direct-map algorithms to obtain the metadata quickly. Also, it
is possible to use ID and location to detect if a location has
been stored before obtaining the metadata so that redundancy
can be greatly reduced with lower performance overhead.The
ARM64 architecture supports Address Tagging, which ig-
nores the highest 8 bits of the 64-bit address during memory
access. Therefore, MinFat Pointer only does little harm to
compatibility and performance.
4 Overview
4.1 Threat Model
Firstly, we believe processors can be trusted, and there are
no hardware security bugs in the processor circuit fabrica-
tion [37, 44]. We assume that the vulnerable program which
only has some dangling pointers may contain one or more
temporal vulnerabilities, such as use-after-free vulnerabili-
ties where an attacker can read from or write to the memory
area which has been freed to the memory management sys-
tem and double_frees or frees of memory, not on the Heap
vulnerabilities, which can corrupt memory management data
structures. To some other memory errors (e.g., buffer over-
flows), We assume that they are already defended by other
Sanitizers such as ASAN [3,23,25,52]. Expressly, we assume
that the attacker cannot access or destroy our data structures,
due to orthogonal defenses such as hardened information hid-
ing, ASLR [31, 33, 36], SGX [13], or other efficient isolation
techniques.
4.2 Components of DangKiller
DangKiller is primarily composed of two modules: the pointer
tracking module, and the delayed free module. The pointer
tracking module tracks the locations of dangling pointer can-
didates;and the delayed free module frees the object when it
has no references. The modules are correspond in Figure 4
and Figure 5 respectively.
According to Figure 4, any dangling pointer will have an
implicit obj-ID calculated by MinFat Pointer.As mentioned
above, we divide the tracking procedure as three steps. Rather
than searching, tracking, and handling in most of work, we
follow the sequence of tracking, searching and handling. For
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Stack
Heap
Obj1
Pointer
Log
Addr1->
Dangling Pointer
Addr2->
Dangling Pointer
Addr3->
Dangling Pointer
Log Cache
Obj1-ID
Addr1
Index
Index
Addr2
Tag: Obj1-ID addr1
Addr2
Tag: Obj2-ID addr3
Addr1
Obj2
Pointer
Log
Addr3
Miss
No need 
to insert
Addr3 same process as 
above, no need to insert
Obj2-ID
Need to insert
Stack
Heap Obj1
Pointer
Log
Obj1-ID
Addr2
Addr1
Addr2 insert
Hash/
Direct-map
(a)
(b)
Addr1->
Dangling Pointer
Addr2->
Dangling Pointer
Figure 4: DangKiller component structures. (a) shows the process of verifying whether a dangling pointer is redundant. (b) shows
the process of inserting a new reference into the log metadata.
tracking, whenever a dangling pointer is stored, by using its
obj-ID and its location address, we can obtain an index of the
Log Cache. If the tag is just correspond to the obj-ID, which
means hit, we don’t need to insert the location address in log
metadata as red cache line and red dotted line shows. The
addr1 has already stored in obj1 log metadata, so it don’t need
to store it again. And it is the same as the gray one. However,
if the cache miss, we need to insert the addr2 in obj2 log
metadata. So we need to step into searching phase. Before
inserting the addr2, as the second picture shown in Figure 4,
we first calculated its implicit obj-ID, and then using hash or
direct-map algorithm to search for the log metadata. When
the address of the metadata is available, we just insert the
location address to the metadata in sequence.This part of the
module relies primarily on the LTO (link-time optimization)
pass of the LLVM [40].
From Figure 5, the process for to free a object, includes
two parts: the right side displays a series of judgments on
the object that the user wants to free, and the left side is
the operation of delaying the free of specific objects in the
free_list periodically. The right side operation determines
whether the user can release the object buf using the module
denoted as Verify Object. This module will verify whether
there still some referring dangling pointers by using the log.
If true, the object is released and the ref_heap_free_list of the
object is obtained. The list consists of many other objects that
cannot be released due to the existence of the buf, and then
Dangkiller continues to verify the list. If the object cannot
be released immediately, it needs to be released later. Then,
relying on whether the location is in a heap, DangKiller selects
the ref_period_free_list or ref_heap_free_list to record the
buf_id. The Period Free, on the left side, isn’t often executed,
unless certain conditions met, see Section 4.6. This process
is similar to the right side, except for the object from the
ref_period_free_list. This part of the module is developed
Figure 5: delayed free module overview.
using LLVM’s compiler_rt runtime library.
5 Design
5.1 MinFat Pointer
The MinFat Pointer is a tagged pointer that uses the highest
6 bits of a pointer to store the metadata information of the
object size, as shown in Figure 3(a). The upper 6 bits store
the upward rounded value of the logarithm for the size of the
object corresponding to the pointer. That is B= dlog2 sizee.
To obtain the boundary of a memory object quickly, we
enlarge the actual allocation size of the object to the nearest
powers of two, denoted as AllocSize. To make this allocation
possible and MinFat Pointer execution effectively, we de-
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signed MinFat pass and run-time-lib. To allocate a AllocSize
object and return MinFat Pointer, we replace all allocation
operations of the user program, such as malloc and new, with
the MinFat_Malloc function. This function, according to the
AllocSize, allocate and align the AllocSize and return it to
the user program with the tag. For the user’s release opera-
tion, such as free or delete, DangKiller will replace it with
MinFat_Free, and a series of delayed free operations will be
performed before calling libc_free. The realloc process may
be relatively complicated because realloc means that a new
object is allocated and the contents of the old object are copied
into it. So to imitate the realloc of the libc, MinFat_Realloc
will call MinFat_Malloc, memcpy, and MinFat_free in se-
quence. If there is still a reference to the old object in the
program, then the old object will not be released. Although
it will bring some memory overhead, it is safer. Also, when
the application is running, it will call a lot of stdlib functions,
such as open, printf, etc. Although standard library function is
developed to be suitable for the ARM64 architecture, there is
still potential poor compatibility, due to the tag in the pointer.
Therefore, replace the stdlib library function with the Min-
Fat_Wrapper when called. The MinFat_Wrapper will first
mask the tag and then call the actual stdlib function.
5.2 Object-Metadata Address Table
An essential part of the pointer tracking module is maintaining
the mapping between memory objects and pointers to support
a quick search of metadata. We want to use ID as an index to
access the object-metadata address table and directly obtain
the log metadata address corresponding to each object. Since
the valid address of the pointer is 48 bits and the ID is also
48 bits, the ideal index has a length of 48 bits, so a table sized
at 248 ∗64B is needed. However, such an implementation is
impossible. To reduce the memory overhead and ensure that
the performance overhead is acceptable, we use a combination
of the direct mapped and hash techniques to reduce the address
table size and minimize the performance overhead.
The direct mapped method directly indexes the object-
metadata address table using the ID. In this way, the overhead
of the search metadata is relatively small. Therefore, we hope
to organize as many objects as possible in this way. We investi-
gated most of the memory allocators, such as the tcmalloc [30]
and ptmalloc [32], and found that nearly all of them use the
lower address space for allocations. Thus, when a pointer
corresponds to the ID within a 2N (N is a threshold parame-
ter to control shared-hash algorithm, and we will detail N in
$7) address space, we use the direct mapped method indexes
the object-metadata address table to obtain the log metadata
corresponding to the object. Whenever a object is allocated
in the address space within 2N by using Minfat_Malloc, an
entry in a table and the log metadata are assigned according
to the ID; similarly, when the object is indeed released (not
user called), it is also necessary to release the metadata. As
Obj1_Ptr_log
Obj2_Ptr_log
Obj1_Ptr_log
nums
Metadata_ptrTag
Obj3_Ptr_log
shared-hash log structure
Obj4_Ptr_log
Obj4_Ptr_log
log structure
Hash
obj-metadata address table
Direct-Map
obj-metadata address table
Metadata_ptr
(a)
(b)
Figure 6: Object-metadata address table and log structure
overview. (a) is in hash circumstance while (b) is direct-map.
shown in Figure 6(b), each table entry pointer to the address
of a log structure which only contains one object metadata.
In some cases, because the object is allocated in a rela-
tively higher address space, we can not use the direct mapped
method. In this case, a hash algorithm is necessary, although
this causes the problem of hash collisions. As multiple ob-
jects may share the same entry of an object-metadata address
table, we record the extra sign in the entry to represent that
the entry corresponds to an ID, and the next object will share
that entry, As Figure 6(a) the red tag shown. Moreover, be-
cause the actual address space uses only 48 bits of the entire
space, we use its high 16-bit or 8-bit storage the sign, a fixed
random value generated by a program to reduce the memory
overhead. Choosing 8-bit tags on the ARM64 platform allows
for excellent compatibility. Although, the 8-bit tag may cause
the same probability of the garbage value increasing in the
memory area, so the tag is randomly generated and allocated,
and a new page is filled with 0. Therefore, we believe an 8-bit
tag is sufficient and the actual test does not appear to be equal.
At a high level, when an object is created, and the address
obtained from the table contains a tag, the object is considered
to have used the same entry, and the log-structured metadata
needs to be shared. To ensure the correctness of the log meta-
data, when multiple objects share a log, if one of the objects is
freed, the log metadata corresponding to the object will not be
cleared. Only after all the objects corresponding to the entry
are freed, will the space be released together. Determining
when the log metadata will be released is explained in $5.3.
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5.3 Shared-Hash Log Structure
Now that we have a mapping relationship of the pointer-to-
object, storing such metadata is especially important. This
is particularly true if multiple objects share the same log
metadata due to hash collisions.
We use the shared-hash log structure to maintain the meta-
data in the scenario of hash collisions, as shouwn in Figure
6(a). The log structure is similar to the log structure proposed
by DangSan. The main difference is that each log corresponds
to a thread with an extra attribute nums, which represents the
number of objects share the log-structured. The nums in other
threads has no practical meaning. When an object is allocated,
DangKiller first determines whether the mapping relationship
of the shared ptr-to-obj is generated. If so, the first address
of its shared-log metadata is obtained and then nums is in-
creased by one. If it is a new mapping, a new entry will be
added to the object-metadata address table and assigned a
shared log-structured metadata with nums = 1. Only when all
the objects corresponding to the log-structured metadata are
freed nums is reset to zero; thus, the space is only released
together. Also, the tag in the tagged pointer is removed from
the object-metadata address table and the value stored in the
entry is set to 0 to indicate that the entry is unoccupied. There
is no hash collision and no sharing is required. When using
multithreading, the nums operation may involve atomic op-
erations, but this only occurs when the object is released and
allocated, indicating the performance overhead is relatively
small.
It is noted that the same thread log metadata may store
the location of the potential dangling pointers for different
objects. As Figure 6(a) shows, the log is shared with objects
1, 2, and 3; object 1 has two potential locations, object 2 has
one potential location, and object 3 has one potential location.
Then, after object 1 is freed, the Verify Object process judges
whether the dangling pointer is still stored in the location
according to its base and bound addresses. Although multiple
objects that correspond to a pointer share a log, the reference
of object 1 is not stored in the memory location which the
object2_ptr_log correspond to. Thus, although we seem to
verify more potential memory locations, it won’t make false
positives. Also, in fact, experiments show that the number of
hash collisions is relatively small, and there are usually only
two objects that share one object-metadata, so log metadata
will not harm the performance of searching and inserting
procedure.
5.4 Log Cache
Another critical part of the pointer tracking module is reducing
the location redundancy. The previous sections explained that
in the pointer tracking process, there are several duplicate
locations that may be stored, so we propose a Log Cache to
reduce these duplicates before looking up the log metadata
Figure 7: Log Cache structure
using the location and the object ID, as shown in Figure 7.
The proposed Log Cache is an independent data structure,
similar to the cache inside the processor. The critical problem
is the indexing and replacement algorithm.
The Log Cache represents whether a location is in log meta-
data of an object. Thus, when accessing the cache, we care
only about the object. Therefore, using the MinFat Pointer we
can quickly obtain the object ID and index the cache.
Most of the internal caches of the processor use some bits
in the middle of the pointer as the index and find the corre-
sponding cache lines ,which is similar to DangSan’s lookup
table. However, unlike the hardware cache, which can access
multiple lines at the same time, the Log Cache is a software
cache and needs to traverse multiple lines using a loop, which
results in a relatively large performance overhead.
Besides,the ID and location are two factors that need to
be considered. Thus, we need an index that contains both
information pieces. Therefore, we design our Log Cache,
and use the XOR value of the ID and location as an index.
The relational algebra with the highest entropy, as shown in
Figure 7, can simultaneously represent the object and location.
Only the Tag is stored in each entry, which determines the
location itself. When the cache is indexed, if the Tag is found
to be at the same location, since the XOR is reproducible, we
believe the location is unneeded. Otherwise, we will register
the location to the log.
The problem of cache replacement is distinct from hard-
ware cache with multi-sets. Since the performance cost of the
algorithm software such as LRU is high, we design the Log
Cache as a direct mapped cache. Therefore, when failing, we
directly replace the original cache line. Although this may
cause some trashing and other problems, we do not consider
these because such scenarios are rare. Also, the replacement
and indexing processes may involve consistency problems
due to multithreading, which may lead to the problem that
improving the redundant rate. But considering the Log Cache
is only to reduce the redundant locations quickly, some ex-
ceptional cases are not considered.
8
Figure 8: (a) shows a common example that dangling pointers shared same ID occurs in the same object many times, like buf[5]
and buf[8]; (b) shows when Log Compression off; (c) shows when Log Compression on
5.5 Log Compression
In the Quantitative Analysis section of Section 3, we have
shown if we can reduce the redundant rate and don’t increase
the time to verifying the redundancy pointers, we can further
reduce the performance overhead. Therefore, we propose the
model of Figure 8(c). We find that pointers sharing the same
ID tend to be stored in adjacent locations, as shown in Fig-
ure 8(a). It is a common scenario for C/C++, if programmers
need dynamically allocate two-dimensional array. Therefore,
one location can represent a contiguous space. We call this
mechanism Log Compression. When the Log Compression
is used, (1) the location stored in the log metadata will not
only represent its location, it may represent 256 or 1024 or
more connected locations. As Figure 8 shows, when the Log
Compression is not open, the address locations store in log
metadata in Figure 8(b) are the address of buf[5] and buf[8],
while in (c), the ID is stored, so the memory overhead will
decrease. (2) locations in Log Cache also serves the same
number of contiguous spaces, then the position in the contigu-
ous area is considered to have been stored by returning hit. As
the Log Cache also store the object buf_ID, the procedure 2 in
(c) will hit, but in (b), it will miss, because of the same buf_ID
sharing with the address of buf[5] and buf[8]. Therefore, the
redundant rate will further decrease without increasing the
verifying time, leading to imporve the performance greatly.
(3) When Verify Object(the module used to verify whether
there is dangling pointer referring to the object), it is also
necessary to determine whether all positions in the entire
contiguous space may store a dangling pointer.
Figure 8(b) and (c) shows two extreme configurations of
Log Compression. Figure 8(b) is no Log Compression, while
Figure 8(c) is the highest level of Log Compression that using
the ID represents the whole object. These two models are
very good at showing very poor and good spatial locality, cor-
responding to computation-intensive and memory-intensive
programs. During compiling, the compiler can decide which
model to use by static analysis of program characteristics.
5.6 Delayed Free
Delayed free is used in dangling pointer elimination tools
such as GC. With the pointer graph maintained by DangKiller,
we can significantly reduce the searching overhead and free
memory objects at more precise timing. As shown in Figure
5, the delayed free module consists of 3 components, Periodi-
cal_Free, Verify Object, and Free_List.
The Verify Object determines whether a memory object
is referenced by a pointer. If such pointer exists, the Verify
Object module informs the Delayed_Free that this object
should not be freed. The Verify Object also decides whether
an object locates on the heap, if so, the Delayed_Free will
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insert that object into the Free_List.
The Free_List is a multi-level linked list, as shown in Figure
9. Objects are inserted into Free_List when they are freed.
Upon inserting, Free_List checks the pointer passed to free()
function. If the pointer is located on the stack or refers a global
variable, the object is inserted into the ref_period_free_list,
waiting for periodically free. If the pointer is stored in another
object (objA), the object is inserted into the ref_heap_free_list,
as shown in Figure 9, and the root of the head is the objA.
Only when the objA is freed, the free_list of objA will be
freed.
Figure 9: Free_List structure
The Periodical_Free periodically decides which objects
can be released. Unlike GC, DangKiller does not make this
check using multithreading. Instead, we use the length of
ref_period_free_list to determine the check timing. if the
length is bigger than the threshold, the Periodical_Free will be
executed. The threshold can be user-specified. And a default
threshold is 1000. All the evaluation in this paper is based on
the default threshold.
6 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of Dangkiller on an ARM64
Linux system. DangKiller is implemented in LLVM 3.8 as
a compile-time instrumentation pass at the IR level, track-
ing heap, address-taken stack, and global objects. The aux-
iliary functions such as minfat_malloc and pointer_register
are grouped in a separated C file. During instrumentation, the
pass will insert calls to these functions into the program IR.
By utilizing the Link-Time Optimization feature of LLVM,
we do not change the ordinary program build process.
Compiler support.We implemented the pointer tracker,
MinFat Pointer memory allocation and free components
instrumentation work on the LLVM compiler framework.
We use link-time optimizations (LTO) and invoke our pass
through the LLVM gold plug-in by the GNU gold linker to
run on the LLVM bitcode of the full program. We use the
GNU gold linker instead of the traditional BFD linker and
specifying a linker flag. Those features allow our system to be
easily integrated into standard build systems for C and C++
programs by only passing compiler flags to enable LTO and
invoke the DangKiller pass.
Run-time support.The complete implementation of the
run-time functions consists of 1761 LoC, and the libc wrap-
pers contain 5269 LOC. The full implementation of the run-
time functions includes registering pointer address to log-
structured functions, shared-log structure metadata functions,
wrapper functions, Log Cache functions, and delayed free
functions.
7 Optimization
In the 5.2 section object-metadata address table, we men-
tioned that the mapping between pointer-to-object needs to
combine direct mapped and hash algorithm. However, how to
select the boundary between two parts, that is, how to choose
the N is especially critical. If N is too large, the memory over-
head will rise sharply. If N is too small, it will lead to a large
number of hash conflicts and bring more performance over-
head. Therefore, it is necessary to select the optimal N based
on the experimental data and the characteristics of the pro-
gram. Also, the same problem occurs in the Log Cache. The
size of the cache will affect the miss rate of Log Cache. The
larger cache will increase the memory overhead of Log Cache
but reduce the performance overhead, and the memory over-
head of log metadata structure. However, since DangKiller is
a dangling pointer elimination system, it needs more memory
than the usual program because a large number of objects
cannot be released. Therefore, slightly increasing the capacity
of the Log Cache and the N does not raise a lot of memory
overhead. So when we design Log Cache and N, we try to
increase its capacity for performance. According to the exper-
imental analysis shown in later chapters, we finally choose N
to be 32, and the logical size of Log Cache is 228.
In addition, whether the Log Compression is on or not is
critical to DangKiller. However, different program has dif-
ferent characteristics, so we use the PCA and cluster analy-
sis [49] to analysis the characteristics of different programs.
And then we use the characteristics to control Dangkiller to
select a better strategy when eliminating dangling pointers.
And the analysis and the final strategy is shown at $8.2.
8 Evaluation
We evaluate DangKiller and DangSan [8] on ARM64 system
with SPEC CPU2006. Bogo [7, 10] is not available because it
relies on Intel MPX [1,48] which is not supported by ARM64
architecture. We did not include CRCount [54] because it is a
closed source software. Additionally, we evaluate DangKiller
on SPEC CPU2017. The setup is a AWS 2.3GHz 16 core
ARMv8 CPU with 32GB RAM. The performance numbers
are the average of 3 runs.
8.1 Effectiveness
To test whether Dangkiller can effectively eliminate use-
after-free vulnerabilities in real-world applications. We use
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NIST/Juliet [9] benchmarks to verify the effectiveness of
our framework. We empirically inspected DangKiller’s elim-
ination capability for 32 cases from NIST/Juliet (CWE416,
Use After Free and Double Free) like Bogo [61]. Dangkiller
soundly eliminated them all.
We benchmarked web servers using Apachebench [2, 5]
with the following settings: 64 concurrent connections in the
client, 100000 requests issued, and one worker process in the
server. We have chosen this configuration to ensure a large
amount of concurrency in the webserver process to stress
DangKiller’s ability to run the real application. We transfer
a tiny file (200 bytes) locally to reduce I/O to a minimum
and stress the CPU to provide a conservative estimate of the
overhead incurred by DangKiller. With Apache, we achieve
5976 requests per second on the baseline and 5531 when
using DangSan. This corresponds with a slowdown of 7%.
8.2 Sensitivity Study
In this part, we study the relationship between Log Compres-
sion patterns and program characteristics. Figure 10 shows
the performance overhead when applying different Log Com-
pression to SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. We can tell that no
Log Compression works well for libquantum, bzip2 and astar,
while Log Compression works well for mcf, milc, gobmk,
and omnetpp.
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Figure 10: Compare the performance overhead of with or no
Log Compression
This is because libquantum, bzip2, and astar are
computation-intensive programs which just use the specific
locations. On the other hand, memory-intensive programs like
mcf and milc usually reference the same object’s different
offset many times. And some benchmarks like sjeng and lbm
which are also computation-intensive benchmarks and have
nearly no store operations and object allocations often are
not affected by this and have lower performance and memory
overhead. Table 1 also demonstrates the same result. From
Table 1, we can see when Log Compression is on, the dup
rates of mcf and milc are always nearly 95% . Thinking about
the number of tremendous pointers, we truly reduce a lot of
memory and performance overhead.
[49] shows the result of the cluster by using the data of
the sampling and profiling on SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks.
When the cluster is 4, the mcf, gobmk, and omnetpp are in the
same cluster using the Log Compression, while sjeng, astar,
and bzip2 are suitable for no Log Compression. The Compiler
could decide whether Log Compression or not, according
to this information. As for memory overhead, it is mainly
decided by the number of pointers being tracked, which is
consistent with the characteristics of performance overhead.
8.3 Performance Overhead
We run SPEC CPU2006 and CPU2017 with DangKiller to
evaluate the performance overhead. The results are shown in
Figure 11 and 12. Some of the benchmarks will malfunction
when compiled with DangKiller, because the tagged pointer
scheme we used to track the relationships between objects
and pointers has inherent compatibility issues. For example,
benchmarks, like gcc, actually utilize the high bits of pointers,
so our tagging process will break the original program.
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Figure 11: Performance Overhead on SPEC CPU2006
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Figure 12: Performance Overhead on SPEC CPU2017
The performance results for the C and C++ programs of the
SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite on the ARM64 system are
presented as Figure 11. Compared with the results reported
by DangSan, some benchmarks such as bzip2, lbm, and sjeng,
DangKiller’s performance is almost the same as Dangsan. On
these benchmarks, both of the tools have a small performance
overhead, and these data can not fully show the difference in
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performance overhead between the two methods. However, on
the other benchmarks, especially benchmarks like mcf, milc,
astar, omnetpp, etc., DangKiller can significantly reduce the
performance overhead. At the same time, DangKiller has bet-
ter performance overhead than DangSan in each benchmark
shown in Figure 11, especially for many memory-intensive
programs. Similar to SPEC CPU2006 (Dangsan can’t run
most of the SPEC CPU2017 benchmarks), except for several
benchmarks with compatibility issues, SPEC CPU2017’s eval-
uation data shows the same features as shown in the Figure
12, but our DangKiller has a better performance in the SPEC
CPU2017, which is closer to the current real situation. Except
for omnetpp, almost all benchmarks have only about 5% per-
formance overhead, and some benchmarks, such as deepsjeng
and lbm, even have about 5% performance improvement. The
performance improvement mainly attributes to that some ob-
jects won’t really execute the libc-free function until the end
of program, because there are still some dangling pointers
reference to them.
DangKiller has an average of 25% and 11% performance
overhead, while DangSan has nearly 50% performance over-
head on ARM64 systems when running the same benchmarks.
The omnetpp benchmark has an extremely high performance
overhead, which is because of the large memory access op-
erations. All the pointer tracking schemes will inevitably en-
counter a similar slowdown on this benchmark. Except for
omnetpp, DangKiller has only 11% and 3% performance loss.
Above all, we can get the conclusion that DangKiller is the
best dangling pointer elimination system, although there are
a few benchmarks limited by Minfat Pointer and ARM64
system compatibility issues.
Additionally, for Bogo using MPX technology, the average
performance loss is about 34%, and in terms of average per-
formance, DangKiller is also better than Bogo. For CRCount,
when using an implicit invalid dangling pointer on an x86 plat-
form. However, we noticed a performance difference between
an ARM64 system and an x86 system. But considering the
difference between ARM64 system and x86 system, for exam-
ple, DangSan has about 40% overhead on x86 system, but on
ARM64, there is a 50% overhead on the system. So CRCount
may have a small increase in overhead on the ARM64 system,
too. On the other hand, CRCount can only partially eliminate
dangling pointer, and we have the confidence to believe our
DangKiller still has a significant advantage.
8.4 Memory Overhead
In the DangKiller, except for data structures, undeleted objects
are the major factor that potentially consumes substantial
memory. To determine the impact of our system on memory
usage, we have measured the mean resident set size (RSS)
while running the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite.
Figure 13 shows the memory overhead of our DangSan and
DangKiller for SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. Our geomet-
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Figure 13: Memory Overhead on SPEC CPU2006
ric mean of all benchmarks is 143.5%, which is higher than
126.4% of DangSan and other existing works. However, Dan-
gsan’s memory overhead comes only from its complex meta-
data structure, while DangKiller is an elimination technique
that delays the free of many objects, resulting in considerable
objects accumulation, which leads to more memory over-
head. For example, mcf uses the realloc function, rather than
detection tools nullifying the dangling pointers, DangKiller
waiting for the former objects’ free, which has nearly four
times memory overhead. In fact, such memory overhead is
unavoidable. Besides, DangKiller needs to allocate and align
the object powers of two, which makes the memory overhead
a bit higher. For Bogo, which reuses spatial metadata, and CR-
Count, which only retains reference counts, Dangkiller does
have a higher memory overhead. In fact, except for omnetpp
and astar, most programs only have an average of 89% of
memory overhead, but considering that in the environment of
memory free, it is acceptable to increase memory overhead in
pursuit of some performance improvements. Of course, if you
are applying to a memory-constrained environment, you can
refer to the method of optimizing Log Cache and shared hash
address space in Section 7 to reduce the memory overhead to
a suitable way.
benchmark #obj #ptrs #dup # freeDSan/DKiller
bzip2 258 2200k 84.9% 97.7% 144
mcf 20 7658m 99.3% 99.5% 7
gobmk 622k 607m 98.3% 99.7% 657k
sjeng 20 4 0% 0% 0
libquantum 164 130 23.1% 70% 179
lbm 19 6004 50% 99.9% 2
milc 6530 2585m 61.9% 95.3% 6468
povray 2427k 4679m 95.3% 97.1% 2461k
omnetpp 267m 13099m 70.3% 80.4% 267m
namd 1339 2970k 62.8% 84.4% 1304
astar 4800k 1235m 89.9% 89.9% 4799k
Table 1: Statistics for SPEC CPU2006.
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8.5 Coverage and Statistics
Table 1 shows the number of memory objects (#obj alloc) and
pointers (#ptrs) we tracked, the number of duplicate point-
ers (#dup) in DangKiller and Dangsan, and how many times
DangKiller tried to free objects (#free). As shown in the #dup
column, we can see that DangKiller identified much more
duplicate pointers than DangSan, especially in some memory-
intensive benchmarks like milc and omnetpp. Therefore, the
Log Compression mechanism can significantly reduce the
redundancy of log metadata, thus improving the performance.
Due to terminating the Verify Object process immediately
after finding dangling pointer, we did not count the number of
dangling pointers when an object is released. Instead, Table 1
shows the total times when the delayed free module tried to
free an object. We found that most of the program in SPEC
CPU2006 allocated many objects without freeing them, espe-
cially in some benchmarks like bizp2 and sjeng. Therefore,
although the times of free are less than the times of allocation,
there were actually a lot of delayed frees. Besides, if an object
is not freed explicitly by the user, we do not free that object.
9 Limitation
While our DangKiller should be able to eliminate nearly all
dangling pointer vulnerabilities in practical settings efficiently,
it has a few fundamental limitations. We discuss these limita-
tions in this section.
There are several limitations faced by every approach based
on pointer tracking [41, 54, 56, 60]. The DangKiller cannot
track metadata for uninstrumented shared libraries. Also, we
only track pointers that are explicitly stored in llvm IR byte-
code, which means that there is one case in which we do
not track: pointers are spilled onto the stack by a function
prologue and will be restored to a register when the function
returns to its caller because spilling is triggered by register
allocation which usually done by CodeGen and MC layer in
llvm. Moreover, Dangkiller doesn’t track pointers copied in a
type-unsafe way. For example, pointers cast to integers and
pointers copied by the memcpy function. Though Dangkiller
has wrappers on std-lib and LTO passes which can track all
the potential type-unsafe pointers, we think there would be a
minimal risk of false negatives because such a scenario is rare.
Also, Dangkiller may be prone to false positives due to type
accuracy issues. However, due to the use of MinFat Pointer,
a pointer with tag information makes this type of accuracy
error less likely than existing work.
Last, although MinFat Pointer is applied to the ARM64
platform with Address Tagging, some programs that perform
particular operations on pointers, such as gcc that manipu-
late high bits of pointers may still cause some compatibility
problems. All the tagged pointer schemes share the same
compatibility issue.
10 Future work
Like many existing elimination works, our delayed free tech-
nique can be implemented with multithreading to reduce its
performance overhead, e.g., periodically using other threads
to detect whether a object in the free_list can be released. We
did not do this because we wanted to implement a lightweight,
dangling pointer elimination tool that can even be suitable
for IoT devices. Implementing a multithreaded scheme on
such devices would consume too much of the already limited
computational resources, and may exceed the power limita-
tion. However, for desktop and server level applications, if
there are additional requirements for performance, we can
also support multithreading features in the future.
Some latest works consider memcpy, which can be used to
copy pointers. Since our work has wrapper for memcpy, we
can track the memcpy in the wrapper function. We believe
that can be developed in the futuer.
Finally, we do not support memory objects collection like
GC. However, combining with the multithreading and our
efficient pointer graph management, we believe that we can
design a lightweight garbage collection for C/C++ in the near
future.
11 Conclusion
We presented the DangKiller, a novel, and lightweight dan-
gling pointer elimination system with low memory and per-
formance overhead. The DangKiller allows a wide range of
C/C++ applications to tolerate dangling pointer vulnerabil-
ities. We generate unique IDs shared by pointers and their
intended referent with a tagged pointer system, MinFat Pointer.
The DangKiller utilizes these IDs to build a high-performance
pointer tracking model and support the delayed free technique.
The free of an object is delayed until its references disappear
during program execution, thus preventing the generation of
dangling pointers. We also proposed an efficient Log Cache
and a Log Compression mechanism, which significantly re-
duced the metadata searching overheads and the redundancy
in dangling pointer candidates. Attaining virtually more safety
guarantee than other pointer invalidation solutions, the Dan-
gKiller incurs 11% and 3% performance overheads respec-
tively on SPEC CPU2006 and CPU2017 benchmarks except
for some special memory-intensive cases. To be concluded,
DangKiller is more efficient than existing dangling pointer de-
tecting systems and can support multithreading by removing
complex pointer-to-object mapping and reducing the redun-
dancy of locations. To foster further research in the field,
we have made the source code of our DangKiller prototype
available as open-source upon acceptance.
13
References
[1] 2011 cwe/sans top 25 most dangerous software errors.
http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/.
[2] ab - apache http server benchmarking tool. https://
httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/programs/ab.html.
[3] Addresssanitizer. https://github.com/google/
sanitizers/wiki.
[4] addresssanitizer design documenta-
tion. http://clang.llvm.org/docs/
HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.
html.
[5] Apache. https://www.apache.org/.
[6] Armv8-a address tagging documentation. http:
//infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=
/com.arm.doc.den0024a/ch12s05s01.html.
[7] Bogo open source implementation. https://github.
com/lzto/bogo/.
[8] Dangsan open source implementation. https://
github.com/vusec/dangsan.
[9] Nist software assurance reference dataset project.
https://samate.nist.gov/SARD.
[10] Struct bound narrowing. https://gcc.gnu.
org/wiki/IntelMPXsupportintheGCCcompiler#
Narrowing.
[11] Periklis Akritidis. Cling: A memory allocator to mitigate
dangling pointers. In Usenix Conference on Security.
[12] Periklis Akritidis, Manuel Costa, Miguel Castro, and
Steven Hand. Baggy bounds checking: An efficient and
backwards-compatible defense against out-of-bounds
errors. Proc Usenix Ssym, pages 51–66, 2010.
[13] Sergei Arnautov, Bohdan Trach, Franz Gregor, Thomas
Knauth, Andre Martin, Christian Priebe, Joshua Lind,
Divya Muthukumaran, Dan O’Keeffe, and Mark L Still-
well. SCONE: Secure linux containers with intel SGX.
In 12th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems De-
sign and Implementation (OSDI 16), pages 689–703,
2016.
[14] Emery D. Berger and Benjamin G. Zorn.
Diehard:probabilistic memory safety for unsafe
languages. Acm Sigplan Notices, 41(6):158–168, 2006.
[15] Tyler Bletsch, Xuxian Jiang, Vince W Freeh, and
Zhenkai Liang. Jump-oriented programming: a new
class of code-reuse attack. In Proceedings of the 6th
ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Com-
munications Security, pages 30–40. ACM, 2011.
[16] H. Boehm. A garbage collector for c and c++. http:
//www.hboehm.info/gc/.
[17] Jeremy Brown, JP Grossman, Andrew Huang, and
Thomas F Knight Jr. A capability representation
with embedded address and nearly-exact object bounds.
Project Aries Technical Memo 5, Tech. Rep., 2000.
[18] Nicholas P Carter, Stephen W Keckler, and William J
Dally. Hardware support for fast capability-based ad-
dressing. In ACM SIGPLAN Notices, volume 29, pages
319–327. ACM, 1994.
[19] Nicholas P Carter, Stephen W Keckler, and William J
Dally. Memory system including guarded pointers, De-
cember 1 1998. US Patent 5,845,331.
[20] Stephen Checkoway, Lucas Davi, Alexandra
Dmitrienko, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Hovav Shacham,
and Marcel Winandy. Return-oriented programming
without returns. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM
conference on Computer and communications security,
pages 559–572. ACM, 2010.
[21] Jim Chow, Ben Pfaff, Tal Garfinkel, and Mendel Rosen-
blum. Shredding your garbage: Reducing data lifetime
through secure deallocation. In USENIX Security Sym-
posium, pages 22–22, 2005.
[22] Thurston HY Dang, Petros Maniatis, and David Wag-
ner. Oscar: A practical page-permissions-based scheme
for thwarting dangling pointers. In 26th USENIX Secu-
rity Symposium (USENIX Security 17), pages 815–832,
2017.
[23] Dinakar Dhurjati and Vikram Adve. Backwards-
compatible array bounds checking for c with very low
overhead. In Proceedings of the 28th international con-
ference on Software engineering, pages 162–171. ACM,
2006.
[24] Dinakar Dhurjati and Vikram Adve. Efficiently detect-
ing all dangling pointer uses in production servers. In
International Conference on Dependable Systems and
Networks (DSN’06), pages 269–280. IEEE, 2006.
[25] Dinakar Dhurjati, Sumant Kowshik, Vikram Adve, and
Chris Lattner. Memory safety without garbage collec-
tion for embedded applications. ACM Transactions on
Embedded Computing Systems (TECS), 4(1):73–111,
2005.
[26] Gregory J Duck and Roland HC Yap. Heap bounds
protection with low fat pointers. In Proceedings of the
25th International Conference on Compiler Construc-
tion, pages 132–142. ACM, 2016.
14
[27] Gregory J Duck and Roland HC Yap. Effectivesan: type
and memory error detection using dynamically typed
c/c++. In ACM SIGPLAN Notices, volume 53, pages
181–195. ACM, 2018.
[28] Gregory J Duck, Roland HC Yap, and Lorenzo Caval-
laro. Stack bounds protection with low fat pointers. In
The Network and Distributed System Security Sympo-
sium (NDSS), 2017.
[29] Josselin Feist, Laurent Mounier, and Marie-Laure Potet.
Statically detecting use after free on binary code. Jour-
nal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques,
10(3):211–217, 2014.
[30] Sanjay Ghemawat and Paul Menage. Tcmalloc: Thread-
caching malloc, 2009.
[31] Cristiano Giuffrida, Anton Kuijsten, and Andrew S
Tanenbaum. Enhanced operating system security
through efficient and fine-grained address space ran-
domization. In Presented as part of the 21st USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 12), pages 475–
490, 2012.
[32] Wolfram Gloger. Ptmalloc. Consulté sur http://www.
malloc. de/en, 2006.
[33] Ben Gras, Kaveh Razavi, Erik Bosman, Herbert Bos, and
Cristiano Giuffrida. Aslr on the line: Practical cache
attacks on the mmu. In The Network and Distributed Sys-
tem Security Symposium (NDSS), volume 17, page 26,
2017.
[34] Istvan Haller, Yuseok Jeon, Hui Peng, Mathias
Payer, Cristiano Giuffrida, Herbert Bos, and Erik
Van Der Kouwe. Typesan: Practical type confusion
detection. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
pages 517–528. ACM, 2016.
[35] Hong Hu, Shweta Shinde, Sendroiu Adrian,
Zheng Leong Chua, Prateek Saxena, and Zhenkai Liang.
Data-oriented programming: On the expressiveness of
non-control data attacks. In 2016 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP), pages 969–986. IEEE, 2016.
[36] Yeongjin Jang, Sangho Lee, and Taesoo Kim. Breaking
kernel address space layout randomization with intel tsx.
In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, pages 380–
392. ACM, 2016.
[37] Koen Koning, Xi Chen, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida,
and Elias Athanasopoulos. No need to hide: Protecting
safe regions on commodity hardware. In Proceedings of
the Twelfth European Conference on Computer Systems,
pages 437–452. ACM, 2017.
[38] Taddeus Kroes, Koen Koning, Erik van der Kouwe, Her-
bert Bos, and Cristiano Giuffrida. Delta pointers: Buffer
overflow checks without the checks. In Proceedings
of the Thirteenth EuroSys Conference, page 22. ACM,
2018.
[39] Albert Kwon, Udit Dhawan, Jonathan M Smith,
Thomas F Knight Jr, and Andre DeHon. Low-fat point-
ers: compact encoding and efficient gate-level implemen-
tation of fat pointers for spatial safety and capability-
based security. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM
SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications
security, pages 721–732. ACM, 2013.
[40] Chris Lattner and Vikram Adve. Llvm: A compilation
framework for lifelong program analysis & transforma-
tion. In Proceedings of the international symposium on
Code generation and optimization: feedback-directed
and runtime optimization, page 75. IEEE Computer So-
ciety, 2004.
[41] Byoungyoung Lee, Chengyu Song, Yeongjin Jang,
Tielei Wang, Taesoo Kim, Long Lu, and Wenke Lee.
Preventing use-after-free with dangling pointers nullifi-
cation. In The Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium (NDSS), 2015.
[42] Daiping Liu, Mingwei Zhang, and Haining Wang. A
robust and efficient defense against use-after-free ex-
ploits via concurrent pointer sweeping. In Proceedings
of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, pages 1635–1648. ACM,
2018.
[43] Matt Miller. Trends and challenges in the vulnerability
mitigation landscape. In 13th USENIX Workshop on
Offensive Technologies (WOOT 19), Santa Clara, CA,
August 2019. USENIX Association.
[44] Santosh Nagarakatte, Milo MK Martin, and Steve
Zdancewic. Watchdog: Hardware for safe and secure
manual memory management and full memory safety.
In 2012 39th Annual International Symposium on Com-
puter Architecture (ISCA), pages 189–200. IEEE, 2012.
[45] Santosh Nagarakatte, Jianzhou Zhao, Milo MK Martin,
and Steve Zdancewic. Softbound: Highly compatible
and complete spatial memory safety for c. ACM Sigplan
Notices, 44(6):245–258, 2009.
[46] Santosh Nagarakatte, Jianzhou Zhao, Milo MK Martin,
and Steve Zdancewic. Cets: compiler enforced temporal
safety for c. ACM Sigplan Notices, 45(8):31–40, 2010.
[47] Gene Novark and Emery D Berger. Dieharder: securing
the heap. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on
Computer and communications security, pages 573–584.
ACM, 2010.
15
[48] Oleksii Oleksenko, Dmitrii Kuvaiskii, Pramod Bhato-
tia, Pascal Felber, and Christof Fetzer. Intel mpx ex-
plained: An empirical study of intel mpx and software-
based bounds checking approaches. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1702.00719, 2017.
[49] Aashish Phansalkar, Ajay Joshi, and Lizy K John. Anal-
ysis of redundancy and application balance in the spec
cpu2006 benchmark suite. ACM SIGARCH Computer
Architecture News, 35(2):412–423, 2007.
[50] Martin Rinard. Acceptability-oriented computing. Acm
sigplan notices, 38(12):57–75, 2003.
[51] Martin C Rinard, Cristian Cadar, Daniel Dumitran,
Daniel M Roy, Tudor Leu, and William S Beebee. En-
hancing server availability and security through failure-
oblivious computing. In OSDI, volume 4, pages 21–21,
2004.
[52] Konstantin Serebryany, Derek Bruening, Alexander
Potapenko, and Dmitriy Vyukov. Addresssanitizer: A
fast address sanity checker. In Presented as part of the
2012 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX-
ATC 12), pages 309–318, 2012.
[53] Kostya Serebryany, Evgenii Stepanov, Aleksey Shlyap-
nikov, Vlad Tsyrklevich, and Dmitry Vyukov. Memory
tagging and how it improves c/c++ memory safety. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1802.09517, 2018.
[54] Jangseop Shin, Donghyun Kwon, Jiwon Seo, Yeongpil
Cho, and Yunheung Paek. Crcount: Pointer invalida-
tion with reference counting to mitigate use-after-free in
legacy c/c++. In The Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium (NDSS), 2019.
[55] Minh Tran, Mark Etheridge, Tyler Bletsch, Xuxian Jiang,
Vincent Freeh, and Peng Ning. On the expressiveness of
return-into-libc attacks. In International Workshop on
Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, pages 121–141.
Springer, 2011.
[56] Erik Van Der Kouwe, Vinod Nigade, and Cristiano Giuf-
frida. Dangsan: Scalable use-after-free detection. In
Proceedings of the Twelfth European Conference on
Computer Systems, pages 405–419. ACM, 2017.
[57] Jonathan Woodruff, Robert NM Watson, David Chisnall,
Simon W Moore, Jonathan Anderson, Brooks Davis,
Ben Laurie, Peter G Neumann, Robert Norton, and
Michael Roe. The cheri capability model: Revisiting
risc in an age of risk. In 2014 ACM/IEEE 41st Inter-
national Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA),
pages 457–468. IEEE, 2014.
[58] Hongyan Xia, Jonathan Woodruff, Sam Ainsworth,
Nathaniel W Filardo, Michael Roe, Alexander Richard-
son, Peter Rugg, Peter G Neumann, Simon W Moore,
Robert NM Watson, et al. Cherivoke: Characterising
pointer revocation using cheri capabilities for tempo-
ral memory safety. In Proceedings of the 52nd Annual
IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitec-
ture, pages 545–557. ACM, 2019.
[59] Wen Xu, Juanru Li, Junliang Shu, Wenbo Yang, Tianyi
Xie, Yuanyuan Zhang, and Dawu Gu. From collision to
exploitation: Unleashing use-after-free vulnerabilities in
linux kernel. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
pages 414–425. ACM, 2015.
[60] Yves Younan. Freesentry: protecting against use-after-
free vulnerabilities due to dangling pointers. In The
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
(NDSS), 2015.
[61] Tong Zhang, Dongyoon Lee, and Changhee Jung. Bogo:
Buy spatial memory safety, get temporal memory safety
(almost) free. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth
International Conference on Architectural Support for
Programming Languages and Operating Systems, pages
631–644. ACM, 2019.
16
